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Black: Monopolies--Producers' Coal Sales Agency and the Sherman Act
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
poses of county taxes the county is the governmental unit. In the
case of state taxes the state is the governmental unit, but the
county assessments are used as the basis on which such taxes are
levied. It is submitted that the rule of the principal case logically bars discrimination in assessment for state taxation of property in different counties. Difficulties of proof, however, are so
great as doubtless to explain why no application of the rule to
such a situation has been found on record.
-CHiARtS H. HADEN.
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Appalachian Coals Incorporated was organized

as the combined and sole selling agency of seventy-three per cent
of all the active coal producers in what is known as the Appalachian Territory, lying in Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky and
Tennessee. The purpose of the agency was to eliminate competitive sales and wasteful and undesirable sales practice between its
members. The government sought to enjoin its formation and
operation as being a combination in restraint of interstate commerce and a monopoly in violation of sections one and two of the
Sherman Act.' The District Court granted the injunction.' The
Supreme Court of the United States, after full review of the
evidence, found that substantial competition would exist in the
coal market even if the agency operated; that the organization
would not reasonably restrain trade; and while retaining jurisdiction in the event the agency in operation did restrain interstate trade, reversed the district court. Appalachtian Coals Inc.
v. United States.'
In construing the Sherman Act the courts at first interpreted
restraint of trade as covering any scheme reducing competition
between independent concerns, whether economically justifiable
or not.' In 1911 the Supreme Court judicially legislated into the
act the rule of reason, taken from the common law on restraint of
trade
The principal case demonstrates clearly the elasticity lent
to the statute by judicially placing in it the rule of reason.
'26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1, 2 (1926).
21 Fed. Supp. 339 (1932).
553 S. Ct. 471 (1933).
' United States v. Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290, 17 S. Ct. 540
United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505, 19 S. Ct. 25
8Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 31 S. Ct. 632
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(1897);
(1898).
(1911);
(1911).
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

A little over twenty-five years ago the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals declared a strikingly similar sales agency illegal
Thus
as a combination in restraint of trade at common law.'
Appalachian Coals, for example, may, as to its intra-state business in West Virginia, be illegal, though the court might find
that to be reasonable today which was an unreasonable restraint
of trade twenty-five years ago.
In the principal case the court boldly assumed that the Sherman Act, "has a generality and adaptability comparable to that
found to be desirable in constitutional provisions." It is true
that constitutional provisions such as the due process clause have
been invariably kept elastic and capable of absorbing the changing
will of the people as expressed through legislative enactment."
But it is a rather remarkable doctrine that attributes a like elasticity to a criminal statute based upon one of the express powers
of Congress. The decision is clearly in line with the government's
policy as to other economic groups such as that of the farmer and
no doubt the public will has to a large extent changed since the
enactment of the Anti-Trust laws. But does the present extremity
of the coal industry justify the court in reflecting a trend away
from the theory that rivalry is the life of trade in advance of legislative action?
It has been objected that indefinite language, especially in a
criminal statute, is in effect a delegation of legislative power to
the court and thus unconstitutional.8 A further objection is that
indefiniteness violates the due process clause of the Constitution
because it does not give the citizen a fixed guide by which he can
reasonably ascertain when he is acting criminally.! Has not the
Couit by the present application of the rule of reason read such
uncertainty into a criminal statute as to give us a piece of unconstitutional judicial legislation?'
-DONALD F. BL.cK.
OPocahontas Coke Co. v. Powhatan Coal and Coke Co., 60 W. Va. 508,
56 S. E. 264 (1906). See also Slaughter v. Thatcher Coal & Coke Co., 55
W. Va. 642, 47 S. E. 247 (1904).
7CUTHBERT W. POUND AND AssociATEs, THE GROWTH op AmERicAN AD-

MINISTRATIVE LAW (1923) 100, 115.
8

Aigler, Legislation in Yague Terms (1923) 21 MicH. L. REV. 831.
1 Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 437.
"Fall v. Sutter County, 21 Cal. 237 (1862) ; cited with approval in Hodges
v. Public Service Commission, 110 W. Va. 649, 159 S. E. 834 (1931).
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